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History tells us that no two business cycles are alike. While there
are essential features that we expect to find in all cycles, we know
that past cyclical contractions (and expansions) have varied widely
in amplitude and duration,1 and even cursory study of past periods
suggests that the causal factors at work in different cycles have also
varied.
If business contractions can vary widely as to duration and ampli-
tude, important questions for policy obviously arise. What causes
these differences in cyclical behavior? How can we predict in ad-
vance or identify at an early stage the kind of downswing inherent
in a particular situation? And what bearing do the answers to these
questions have on the kinds of stabilization measures which are
likely to be most effective in combating an incipient depression?
The most recent theoretical literature—with its emphasis on sim-
plified models—provides us with but limited help when we try to
classify and explain these differences in behavior from cycle to cycle.
Recent theoretical models have been of much too simple a form—
too few variables and equations, too simple a system of lags, and
too much dependence on unchanging relationships—to reproduce
the wide diversity of cyclical experience that we find in practice.
There is, however, a moderately large body of literature on the
possibility of different kinds of cycles. Without attempting to be ex-
haustive, we may mention Schumpeter's three-cycle model, several
variants of the major-minor cycle hypothesis, the view that the
character of major cycles is influenced to an important degree by
the course of the long building cycle, and the work done on the
interrelation between secular trends or' "long waves" on the one
hand and business cycles on the other. Perhaps mention should also
be made of the older view that some but not all booms lead to
I am indebted to the Bureau of Business and Economic Research of the Uni-
versity of California for assistance in the preparation of this paper.
1 Cf. Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell, Mea8uring Business Cycles,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946, Chaps. 9—12.
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financial and monetary "crises" that generate unusually severe de-
pressions.2
I do not think it is necessary to reviewthis literature here. Instead
I shall take the liberty of merely stating several conclusions that I
have drawn from these writings and from a fairly intensive study of
American business cycles since World War I. (1) There is consider-
able justification, both in theory and on empirical grounds, for a
flexible version of the major-minor cycle hypothesis; and this dis-
tinction, if carefully drawn and applied, can help us in interpreting
past and current fluctuations in economic activity. (2) The empirical
evidence does not lend much support to rigid multi-cycle, models,
such as Schumpeter's. (3) Even those writers who use some variant
of the two-cycle hypothesis have not drawn an adequately careful
distinction between major and minor cycles. Too often in applied
work the distinction rests merely on differences in statistical be-
havior (particularly the amplitude of downswings), although the
basis of the distinction is supposed to be a difference in causation.
(4) Not enough attention has been paid to the possibility of mixed
or hybrid types which combine some of the characteristics of both
major and minor cycles. (5)And,finally, there is some reason to be-
lieve that the effectiveness of various types of stabilization measures
depends in part on the type of boom or downswing they are in-
tended to combat.
In the pages that follow I shall attempt to develop an analytical
framework that permits a more precise (and I think more useful)
differentiation of cycles than is involved in the usual formulation of
the two-cycle hypothesis. In the concluding sections of the paper I
shall consider some of the implications of my analytical scheme for
the formulation of an effective stabilization program.8
2Detailedreferences to this fairly familiar literature are scarcely necessary.
See, however, Burns and Mitchell, op. cit., Chaps. 10 and 11, for discussion of
some of these and an attempt to apply statistical tests to them. The best
source for Joseph Schumpeter's exposition of his three-cycle model is his Business
Cycles, 1939, Vol. I, pp. 16 1—174; see also his essay "The Analysis
of Economic Change," reprinted in Readings in Business Cycle Theory, Blakiston,
1944, esp. pp. 12—16. Alvin Hansen's position regarding different kinds of cycles
is summarized in his Business Cycles and National Income, Norton, 1951, Part I.
See also Moses Abramovitz, Inventories and Business Cycles, National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1950, Chap. 21, and R. A. Gordon, "Cycliëal Experience
in the Interwar Period: The Investment Boom of the 'Twenties," in Conference
Business Cycles, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951, pp. 163—168.
Some of these sources contain references to earlier writings on the subject.
The next three sections are reproduced here only in summary form. For a
more detailed presentation, representing a revision of these sections as originally
presented at this conference, see my "Investment Behavior and Business Cycles,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, February 1955.
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Minor Cyclical Movements
We know from past experience that, even without significant
fluctuations in long-term investment, we can get mild cyclical move-
ments in income and employment. It is not difficult to construct a
dynamic model that will generate fluctuations in income, em-
ployment, prices, etc., even in the absence of fluctuations in long-
term investment. If production plans are made in advance of sales
and in response to factors partly different from those determining
the subsequent demand for the planned output, businessmen will
experience price changes or unplanned changes in inventories. As
a result, production plans are subject to continuous revision; and,
depending on the nature of the assumed relationships, cumulative
movements result. Production plans may also need to be revised be-
cause of cyclical instability in the relation between consumption and
income and because of induced changes in cost-price relations and
in businessmen's attitudes toward liquidity.
Thus minor cyclical movements may occur even without fluctu-
ations in long-term investment. Such fluctuations will tend to be of
moderate amplitude and short duration; they will be reflected in
fairly narrow fluctuations in consumption but in wide movements
in inventory investment.
Investment Opportunities
We now turn to the determinants of investment behavior (ex-
clusive of inventories). We begin with a distinction between "under-
lying investment opportunities," on the one hand, and inducements
to exploit these opportunities, on the other. The stock of investment
opportunities at any moment may be defined as the difference be-
tween the existing capital stock and that which businessmen would
find it most profitable to have if they were well informed regarding
all relevant cost and demand relationships and the forces making
for long-run growth in the economy. Thus we may speak of an
"appropriate" level and corn position of the capital stock, and we
may look on all investment (not based on mistaken expectations)
as an attempt to modify the existing capital stock in the direction
of what is appropriate.
The appropriate capital stock is always changing, thereby creat-
ing new investment opportunities. Investment opportunities arise
because of technological change, population growth, changes in
taste, governmental intervention, and other forces which may be
considered exogenous from the point of view of the cycle. Invest-
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ment opportunities are further widened or narrowed by purely
cyclical changes, e.g. through innovations induced by changing
cost-price relations, through movements in interest rates and prices
of capital goods, and, most important, by the rate at which existing
opportunities are exploited through current investment.
If investment opportunities were perfectly known, there would
be, for any appropriate capital stock, an equilibrium rate of invest-
ment per time period, determined in effect by certain lags and the
elasticity of supply both of loanable funds and of capital goods out-
put. Actually, investment opportunities are not known with cer-
tainty. The inducement to exploit a given stock of investment op-
portunities varies with the cycle; it depends primarily upon profit
and sales expectations and current attitudes toward liquidity. Thus
the volume of current investment is a function of the (changing)
state of investment opportunities, of other variables which also in-
fluence profit and sales expectations, and of the variables influenc-
ing liquidity attitudes.
Total investment is not a homogeneous aggregate with respect
to the ways in which investment opportunities arise. One useful
classification divides total investment into the following groups:
(1) replacement expenditures, the opportunities for which are
created by wear and tear and obsolescence (replacement because
of obsolescence perhaps belongs in our third category); (2) ex-
pansions in capacity induced simply by a rise in aggregate income
in the economy as a whole (this occurs particularly in older in-
dustries not subject to important technological changes); (3) net
investment intended to exploit new opportunities which come about
for reasons other than an increase in aggregate output (new proc-
esses, new products, changes in tastes, etc.); (4) residential build-
ing, which has a particularly high capital-output ratio and is inti-
mately related to population growth and migration; and (5) in-
ventory investment.
Three Types of Contraction
The cyclical forces described in the preceding sections can lead to
different sorts of cyclical contractions, which we can conveniently
group into three broad types.
First, we have the case of the "pure" minor recession, in which
the cyclical response mechanism operates without affecting long-
term investment. The downturn comes because of a downward re-.TYPES OF DEPRESSIONS
vision of short-period production plans. The stock of investment
opportunities remains large, and there is no significant deteriora-
tion in the inducements to exploit these opportunities. The neces-
sary adjustments are brought about through moderate price de-
clines, some contraction of short-term debt, and the curtailment of
production in order to reduce inventories. Examples of minor-
cycle contractions of this sort are those which occurred in 1923—
1924, 1927, 1949, and 1953—1954.
The "pure" minor cycle becomes less pure as changes in pro-
duction plans lead also to changes in investment plans. This brings
us to our next case, which results in sharp but relatively short
cyclical contractions. We may call this the "hybrid" case, inter-
mediate between the pure minor and the pure major cycle.
A hybrid contraction may occur for either of two reasons. In the
first place, once a downswing begins for any reason, the deteriora-
tion in short-term expectations may affect long-term expectations,
even though investment opportunities remain large enough to sup-
port long-term investment at its previous peak rate. The second pos-
sibility is that, at the end of a particularly vigorous boom, a cycli-
cally induced monetary or real capital shortage may temporarily
reduce the stock of profitable investment opportunities.
What is important about this hybrid case is that the revival of
long-term investment is brought about endogenously through the
operation of the cyclical response mechanism: as soon as excess in-
ventories are liquidated, prices stop falling, interest rates and capi-
tal goods prices fall to lower levels, etc. Thus while contractions
which arise in this way may be quite sharp, they are not likely to
last very long. It is more useful to think of the depressions of 1907,
1937—1938, and (with some qualifications) 1921 in these terms, as
hybrid contractions, rather than as "major" depressions.
Finally, we have the case of the major cycle proper, in which a
high level of investment has been maintained for a long enough
time so that long-term investment opportunities become seriously
impaired, even without the advent of a capital shortage. When a
depression develops for this reason, the forces making for revival
that gradually emerge from the contraction will not be enough in
themselves to restore the stock of investment opportunities. The
severity of the depression will depend particularly on how much
overbuilding went on during the preceding boom, on the strength
of the forces making for further growth which open up new invest-
ment opportunities, and on the nature of the financial maladjust-
11TYPES OF DEPRESSIONS
tnents resulting from earlier speculative excesses. To this category
of prolonged (and usually severe) major depressions belong the de-
pressions of the 1870's, 1890's, and 1930's and probably also that of
1882—1885.
Stabilization Policy
Let us turn now to a cOnsideration of some of the apparent im-
plications of the preceding analysis, so far as it is valid, for busi-
ness cycle policy. Several rather obvious implications immediately
emerge from the argument of the preceding sections. (1) There is
no one kind of program which would be equally effective against
all cyclical contractions.(2) An effective stabilization program
needs to be flexible, and its details should to some extent be tailor-
made to fit the changing character of the cycle. (3) Therefore, an
essential requirement is continuing and careful diagnosis of cur-
rent cyclical developments, both in order to influence the current
phase of the cycle(if that is desired) and as preparation for.
prompt action in the most effective way if future developments
should take an unfavorable turn. (4) A further conclusion, derived
from the preceding ones, is that an effective stabilization program
cannot rely exclusively on automatic stabilizers.Discretionary
action, extending beyond the field of merely monetary policy, is
necessary in all except relatively pure minor cycles.4
While I think we need to re-evaluate some of the conventional
instruments of stabilization policy in terms of the types of depres-
sion they may be aimed at, certain minimal techniques are appro-
priate regardless of the type of instability anticipated. This is
particularly true of the so-called. automatic stabilizers and of
monetary policy.
Two essential and familiar features of all cyclical contractions
are the multiplier process whereby a decline in spending reduces
incomes and therefore leads to still further reductions. in spending,
and the effect of the increased desfre for liquidity on production
and investment plans.
•The automatic stabilizers—by reducing tax receipts and increas-.
ing transfer payments as the national income declines—moderate
the cumulative contraction in disposable income and in consumers'
expenditures. Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of the present stabi-
Perhaps it is unnecessary for me to add that these conclusions follow only
if the stabilization objective is paramount—or, at least sufficiently so to outweigh
objections that might be raised on other grounds to discretionary government
intervention.
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lizers could be improved,5 but any retardation in the decline in
disposable income and consumption will have some influence, in a
degree depending on the circumstances, in ameliorating the de-
terioration in profit expectations and in liquidity attitudes and will
reduce the decline in production necessary to bring about a given
decrease in inventories. Some favorable effects on long-term in-
vestment, again in a degree depending on the circumstances, may
also be expected.
The principal role of monetary policy, regardless of the type of
depression, is to combat the increased desire for liquidity. To the
extent that it is successful in doing so, it will hold back the liquida-
tion of inventories and the consequently exaggerated decline in out-
put, ameliorate the decline in commodity and security prices and
the resulting further deterioration of expectations, and lend some
support to the inducement to exploit existing investment opportun-
ities. It is likely also to have some beneficial effect on consumers'
expenditures, particularly for durable goods.
Let us now look at our three main types of depression to see
what additional measures are best suited to each. A "pure" minor
recession, with little or no decline in the sum of private long-term
investment and government expendfture, does not, of course, cause
a great deal of damage. For such mild and short-lived deflationary
episodes, one might argue that no correctives are needed beyond
the mechanical working of the automatic stabilizers and a prompt
and strong dose of an easy money policy. The stronger the under-
lying trend toward secular inflation, the stronger the argument
against going farther than this if one is confident that only a minor
recession is involved.
Since we can never feel perfectly sure of our diagnosis, and par-
ticularly if the community is not prepared to tolerate an unemploy-
merit rate higher than, say, 5percent even for a short period,
additional discretionary action might be taken to ameliorate a minor
recession and hasten revival. "Formula flexibility" might be intro-
duced into the system of unemployment insurance, so that payment
provisions become more liberal as the unemployment rate rises.
Expenditures on the lighter types of public works, which could be
started quickly and completed within a short period, could be ac-
celerated. It does not seem to me, however, that this sort of minor
recession is the time for discretionary tax cuts, to be reversed later,
or for an elaborate public works program.
A. C. Hartofferssome suggestions for improvement in Moneg, Debt, and
Economic Prentice-Hall, 1948, pp. 480 if.
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In all probability, something can be done to eliminate or offset
the specific maladjustments that might bring on a minor downswing.
Let me suggest one or two illustrations. Assume that consumers'
stocks of durable goods rise to the point that sales of such goods
decline and initiate a general downswing, the underlying invest-
ment situation, however, remaining favorable in these and other
industries.6 Special credit facilities can be extended to the affected
industries to permit easier credit terms to consumers, to assist these
industries in carrying inventories, and to reduce the rate of re-
possessions. Efforts might also be made to bring about significant
price reductions. Or to take another example, if the major difficulty
seems to be the impact of a drop of wholesale commodity prices
on short-term expectations and production plans, government pur-
chases of strategic and farm commodities could be accelerated to
the extent permitted by legislative enactment, and, within the
framework of an easy money policy, special efforts could be made to
encourage bankers to help business firms carry their existing in-
ventories.
Let us now look at our second and more interesting type of con-
traction, the "intermediate" or "hybrid" case. I think most discus-
sions of depression policy envisage this sort of recession—i.e. a con-
traction of considerable amplitude, associated with a fairly sharp
drop in private long-term (as well as inventory) investment, but
with no significant impairment of underlying investment opportun-
ities. Under these circumstances the right kind of expansionary
measures can well have the desired pump-priming or "leverage"
effects.
Clearly, the measures suggested above for a minor recession are
suitable here also. The more successfully income and consumption
can be maintained through the operation of the automatic stabi-
lizers and a discretionary increase in government expenditures, the
less serious will be the impairment of inducements to exploit exist-
ing investment opportunities. In this type of sharp contraction, also,
itis particularly essential that everything possible be done to
combat the rapid and cumulative deterioration in attitudes toward
liquidity.7 A vigorous use of the conventional instruments of
6suspect that periodic saturation of consumers' demands for durables and
perhaps semidurables will play a more important role in creating minor fluctua-
lions in the future than it did before World War II.
To the extent that capital shortage was responsible for the downturn, the
contraction process will provide an automatic correction; but it then becomes
imperative to combat a new deflationary force—the recession-inspired scramble
for liquidity.
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monetary policy can flood the system with excess reserves, the pur-
pose being not only to reduce interest rates but, more important, to
minimize the increase in credit rationing resulting from the re-
evaluation of risks by lenders and to satisfy the increased desire for
liquidity by business firms. One result I think it is important to aim
at is the maintenance of replacement demand. In a depression this
demand is likely to be sensitive to an increased desire for liquidity.
An easy money policy, particularly if promptly initiated, should also
help to hold back the decline in security and commodity prices
and therefore further bolster business confidence.8
Beyond these minimal measures, something can be done directly
to stimulate the inducements for exploiting existing investment op-
portunities and possibly, also, to create new opportunities. Lower
interest rates will obviously help. A proposal frequently suggested
is some form of tax remission or direct subsidy for private invest-
ment undertaken during periods of depressed activity.9 While I
have no great confidence that this could be done promptly and
and without great friction, government-induced reductions in the
prices of capital equipment and building materials, beyond what can
normally be expected in a cyclical decline, would provide some addi-
tional stimulus to investment, chiefly by leading some firms to main-
tain or increase expenditures and to anticipate future investment
needs. It is not clear that a moderate cut in this category of prices
would have a bad effect on short-term expectations, but I suspect
that it might create some difficult wage problems in these generally
highly organized industries.'0
8 The need, through both general monetary policy and more specific measures,
to increase the availability of funds for investment in depression periods is empha-
sized by N. H. Jacoby and J. F. Weston in their paper "Financial Policies for
Regularizing Business Investment," in Regularization of Business Investment,
Princeton University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1954.
For some discussion of the possibilities here see E. C. Brown, "Business In-
come Taxation and Investment Incentives," in Income, Employment, and Public
Policy: Essays in Honor of Alvin H. Hansen, Norton, 1953, pp. 300—316; H. M.
Groves, Postwar Taxation and Economic Progress, McGraw-Hill, 1946; R. S.
Brown, Jr., "Techniques for Influencing Private Investment," in Income Stabiliza-
tion in a Developing Democracy, Max Millikan, editor, Yale University Press,
1953, pp. 416—432; and J. P. Shelton and G. Ohlin, "A Swedish Tax Provision for
Stabilizing Business Investment," American Economic Review, june 1952, pp.
375—380. These sources contain references to other literature on the subject. This
topic is also touched on in some of the papers in Regularization of Business Invest-
ment, as cited.
10 For further discussion of what might be done to maintain private investment
in (by implication) our intermediate type of contraction, see the papers in
Regularization of Business Investment, as cited. A good many of the authors were
pessimistic as to the possibilities unless aggregate demand could first be supported
through general monetary-fiscal measures. The chief grounds for pessimism were
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In general, it is this "hybrid" type of depression which 'offers the
fullest scope for the conventional instruments of stabilization policy
because, by vigorous and prompt action, we can hope to bring about
a revival in private spending without undue delay. The more suc-
cessfully aggregate demand is maintained, the more willing will
businessmen be to exploit existing investment opportunities. A
combined monetary and fiscal policy can slow down the decline in
private spending; fiscal policy working through increased govern-
ment expenditures and reduced tax receipts can partially offset the
decline in private investment; and the specific measures previously.
mentioned, as well as others, can be used to stimulate private in-
vestment.
Perhaps it is superfluous to add that the hybrid case, even more
than a minor recession, may require measures aimed at' specific
types of maladjustment. Prompt action may be necessary to con-
trol liquidation in the commodity and security markets. Agricul-
ture may need special help. It may be possible to stimulate the de-
mand for consumers' durables or to increase the availability of
mortgage credit. And so on.
The hybrid case shades into the more serious situation of a major
depression, in which there is a significant impairment of underlying
investment opportunities. Reference to reduced investment oppor-
tunities does not necessarily mean secular stagnation in a really long-
run sense. The impairment of investment opportunities may be and
in the past has been temporary. But, while this situation lasts, meas-
ures aimed at maintaining or reviving disposable income and con-
sumption will not be enough to restore private investment to the
level needed for full employment. In short, this is the case in which
pump priming will have only limited success and the "leverage ef-
fects" of expansionary measures will be disappointingly small.
The types of policy already discussed should also be appropri-
ate in a major depression; but, if these restorative efforts seem to
have only limited effect and if private investment continues to
decline, further steps can be taken. The public works program can
be expanded, with particular attention being paid to those types of
construction and those geographical areas which have been hardest
(1) that the present value of investment made in slack times is less than in booms
because the higher earnings of prosperity must be discounted for a longer period,
(2) that the risks of anticipating future needs are considered too great both be-
cause of possible obsolescence and because of depression liquidity attitudes, and
(3) the reduced availability of funds in depression, particularly from retained
earnings (see, for example, the paper presented by Joel Dean).
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hit.hl Efforts can be intensified to stimulate investment by mone-
tary policy and by tax and other investment incentives. In addition,
lower interest rates and reduced prices for capital goods will extend
the margin of profitable investment opportunities in some direc-
tions.
It should, however, be possible to go farther than this in acceler-
ating the expansion of investment opportunities. Political and ad-
ministrative problems might well arise, and it would probably be
quite difficult in some cases to secure the detailed information neces-
sary for effective action. In addition, the stabilization authorities
might run into a 'special problem of timing and diagnosis. Vigorous
application of the measures already mentioned might well stop
even a major downswing and bring about a substantial revival in
activity. After all, a considerable stock of investment opportunities
always exists. It may well be that a new upswing will begin which
will peter out too early, because the stock of investment opportuni-
ties is not yet sufficient to maintain for long, if at all, a satisfactorily
high level of employment. Hence, mistaken or incomplete diag-
nosis of investment prospects might lead to deferment of some kinds
of action until a second downswing had occurred.
What are some of the ways in which the stock of private invest-
ment opportunities might be expanded? I have not tried systemat-
ically to explore the major possibilities, but the following cursory
suggestions may provide a basis for discussion. Also, I shall not
consider whether any of these suggestions might entail a greater
degree of detailed government intervention than a large section
of public opinion would be prepared to accept.
Lower interest rates and prices of capital goods have already
been mentioned. Special aid might be given to relatively young in-
dustries which perhaps had become temporarily overbuilt but
which had 'considerable growth ahead of them—for example,
financial assistance to firms in difficulties and technical help in 'ac-
celerating the reduction in cost and improvement in product. Tax
incentives and other government help could be offered generally to
stimulate industrial research arid modernization. Public expendi-
tures might be made with a view to expanding particular indus-
tries. Thus road and street improvements might stimulate the auto-
mobile and house-building industries; construction and improve-
Themore important literature on the countercyclical use of public works
expenditures is familiar enough not to require extensive citations here. For one
recent useful contribution see M. L. Colean and Robinson Newcomb, Stabilizing
Construction: The Record and Potential, McCraw-Hill, 1952, esp. Appendix Z.
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ment of airports would help the aircraft and related industries;
government assistance in the exploration for new oil reserves might
result in a substantial increment of private investment in the im-
portant oil industry; and so on. Undoubtedly there are many other
ways of helping private industry to develop new opportunities for
expansion of which it is not yet aware.12
Particularly difficult problems are created when a major depres-
sion is brought on or intensified by the downswing of a building
cycle, particularly in residential construction. This may well be
a problem that the American economy will have to cope with
sometime during the 1950's. In recent years nonfarm residential
building has amounted to half or more of new private construc-
tion activity, and the latter has been nearly half of gross private
domestic investment excluding additions to inventories. In the last
few years we have been adding new dwelling units at a rate of bet-
ter than a million a year, which is considerably higher than the rate
of new-family formation that we can probably expect during the
middle and late 1950's.
A serious decline in residential building is likely to mean that
there has been a decline in the stock of investment opportunities
in one or both of two ways. There may have been overbuilding,
so that the current stock of housing is too large, given the size and
other characteristics of the population and given also current in-
comes and prices. Second, and less serious, there may not have been
any overbuilding, but the past rate of building (which brought the
stock of dwellings up to the appropriate level) may have been larger
than that called for by current and expected future increments of
demand. If the stock of housing does become excessive, particularly
if a decline in income and a deterioration of liquidity atti-
tudes also occur, the supply of mortgage funds may dry up, thereby
reducing the level of building activity still further..
These considerations suggest the general lines along which at-
tempts to revive residential building activity might proceed. I should
prefer to leave the details to the experts, and I note that Mr. Creb-
ler is contributing a paper on financial aids to housing. Perhaps the
following suggestions, however, can at least be noted, Slum clear-
ance and other forms of subsidized demolition can contribute to
reducing an excess stock of housing. Special tax and financial in-
ducements can be offered to private builders of housing for low
12 Special mention should probably be made of the whole field of foreign in-
vestment, where undoubtedly much could be done to stimulate the flow of private
capital to other parts of the world.
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and middle income groups. Special efforts can be made to bring
down building costs and to stimulate the maintenance and im-
provement of existing dwellings. Public works can be undertaken
in part with a view to stimulating residential and commercial build-
ing_for example, improvement of streets and roads and public
transportation systems, and the opening up of potentially attractive
new suburban areas.13 Government efforts that stimulate internal
migration—for example, through decentralization of industry and
government—may also tend to stimulate construction activity. It
goes without saying that, from the point of view of a coordinated
stabilization program, the time for accelerating the construction of
public housing projects is during depression rather than boom
periods—and particularly during periods of depressed building ac-
tivity.
On the financial side, mortgage credit regulations can be relaxed,
particularly if they had been tightened during the preceding boom.
Unfortunately, American policy since World War II has been to
stimulate the flow of mortgage credit in boom periods also, except
for a short period after the outbreak of the Korean crisis.14 In-
creased government support of the secondary mortgage market
might be helpful during a period of depressed activity, as would
steps to relax unduly tight credit standards applied by institutional
lenders.
The measures discussed in the preceding pages can do some good,
but undoubtedly they cannot prevent a major depression. Delays
in diagnosis and the inevitable political and economic problems
involved in putting any large-scale discretionary program into effect
mean that, if a serious impairment of investment opportunities were
to occur, steps could not be taken in time to prevent a business
contraction of considerable magnitude. But perhaps I am more
pessimistic than I should be.
Concluding Remarks
I have had little to say about wage-price policy and how it should
be applied in the different kinds of contractions, largely because
I am not at all sure I know the answer. A few sketchy observations
13 It has been suggested that for every dollar spent in improving the Long
Island Railroad, several dollars of additional demand for suburban housing on
Long Island would be created.
14 Cf. Leo Grebler, "Stabilizing Residential Construction—A Review of the
Postwar Test," American Economic Ret,iew, September 1949, pp. 898—910, and
Colean and Newcomb, op. cit.,pp.145—147.
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will have to sulEce. I see little reason for tampering with the wage-
price structure in minor recessions. Wages would certainly decline
little if at all; a moderate decline in flexible prices would probably
do more good than harm; and by definition the moderate decline
in prices relative to wages that would be associated with a minor
recession would not seriously impair long-term profit expectations.
In the hybrid case, exaggerated liquidation in commodity and
security markets should obviously be prevented, if possible. Per-
haps I am too confident that a vigorous easy money policy would
help in this respect. Beyond this, we can assume that a farm price-
support program would hold within moderate limits the decline in
domestic agricultural prices. In the international sphere I should be
happy to see an established, adequately financed buffer stock
scheme. Something might be done to bring about some reduction
in the prices of capital goods, through consultation with industry
leaders. But since I suspect that the hybrid case is not the time
for government pressure on wage rates, I have some doubts about
pushing reductions in industrial prices to the point where we risk
serious wage-price distortions and a further deterioration in busi-
ness confidence.
In a prolonged major depression, downward pressure on prices
and wages will, of course, be stronger than in the milder types of
contraction. And the creation of some needed new investment oppor-
tunities may well require substantial changes in prices and costs
in particular sectors. I have no great confidence that a stepped-up
antitrust program will help reduce inflexible prices; government-
industry cooperation may do a bit more; government and private
measures aimed at stimulating greater efficiency in order to reduce
costs may do a little more. Widespread wage cuts should not be
pressed until fairly late in the downswing, and then the government
might make a contribution by helping to bring about the reduc-.
tions considered necessary in a few key industries. I share the view
expressed by others that wage reductions should not be dragged
out over a long period. A once-for-all cut relatively late in a con-
traction is probably better.
I do not think that either an effective or a practicable stabiliza-
tion program can rely on a combination of the "castor oil treatment"
(sharp downward revision of the cost-price structure and wide-
spread bankruptcy of weak firms) and the "Pigou effect" (the
stimulus given by the increased real value of cash balances to an
increase in spending in relation to income). At the same time, ef-
forts to bolster every weak spot that develops to the point of pre-
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venting needed price and cost adjustments can seriously delay
recovery.
Probably the most important problem I have ignored is the one
of diagnosis. Granted there is something in the sort of distinction
I have tried to draw, how do we recognize the kind of contraction
being presaged by a downturn in the more important business indi-
cators? Perhaps empirical research will eventually tell us that cer-
tain constellations of behavior among various time series at cyclical
peaks are associated with particular types of depression.15 One
difficulty is that the early stages of a contraction may look entirely
like a minor recession and, indeed, be preceded by a minor boom.
Only as the downswing develops do businessmen come to re-
evaluate long-term investment opportunities.
So far as I know, the only way out is careful analysis of the un-
folding business situation, done in considerable detail and on the
basis of a continuously improving body of information. In particu-
lar, we need more and better information on the factors influencing
the production and investment plans of business firms and the
spending plans of consumers. Needless• to say, the time to start
preventing a depression is during the preceding expansion. And
when the beginnings of a downturn are recognized, the answers to
three questions should be ready so far as it is possible to obtain
them. What minor maladjustments need to be corrected, and how
serious do they seem to be? To what extent do the speculative char-
acteristics of the preceding boom suggest the imminence of a sub-
stantial secondary deflation? And, in many respects most important,
what seem to be the long-term prospects for each important cate-
gory of private investment? It is the answer to the third question
which is likely to determine how intractable a depression will be.
Government commitments to spend belong in our concept of invest-
ment opportunities. Today government expenditures are considerably
greater than gross private investment, and it does not seem likely
that their total will fall below the level of private investment in
the near-term future. As. a result, a given percentage decline in
private investment would mean less than haff as great a relative
decline in total nonconsumption expenditures, even without any
contracydical increase in government spending. This can be bad
enough, but it suggests that for this reason alone "major depres-
sions" are a somewhat less fearsome possibility than they have
15 In this connection, note the interesting experiments reported by Geoffrey H.
Moore in "The Diffusion of Business Cycles," in Economics and the Public Inter-
est,RobertA. Solo, editor, Rutgers University Press, 1955, pp.
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been in the past. And, so far as the troublesome hybrid type. of de-
pression is concerned, we can safely assume that, in the absence
of a philosophy of "balanced budgets at any cost," this type of "in-
vestment" (i.e. government spending) would be in any event well
maintained. Unfortunately, this still leaves us with plenty of po-
tential instability to worry about.
COMMENT
ELMER C. Biwrr, Lehigh University
The difficulty of distinguishing the various types of contraction,
which Gordon describes, might be partially remedied by a different
kind of classification of depressions. He holds that "the only way
out is careful analysis of the unfolding business situation, done in
considerable detail and on the basis of a continuously improving
body of information." If the attempt were to differentiate the busi-
ness cycle from the long cycle, this prescription might be consider-
ably modified.
A shrinkage in investment opportunities is a notable character-
istic of the peak levels of the long cycle. The seriousness of a subse-
quent depression ts directly dependent upon the extent of the
shrinkage which has taken place, and the latter can often be de-
termined by a study of approaching saturation in growth indus-
tries, made industry by industry.' I believe that a stage is reached at
which most of these industries experience, or are about to experi-
ence, a marked shrinkage in new-owner demand.
This is only one of the ways of predicting the continuation of
the fundamental factors on which the high level of the long cycle
rests. A study, industry by industry, of the development of new
companies also offers promise in this respect. Department of Com-
merce studies under the direction of Lawrence Bridge indicate that
new companies account for a large percentage of total investment.
It may be possible to show that a point is reached, while the long
cycle is still at a high level, at which the promise of new-company
formation significantly declines in a predominant group of indus-
tries.
A study of the changing need for replacement is another promis-
ing area. Studies are needed of the changed age distribution of the
'A list of rapidly growing industries is given in two Department of Com-
merce publications: Markets after Defense, pp. 66—71, and the Survey of Cur-
rent Business, January 1953, PP. 5—10.
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stock of commodities in various durable industries. It appears likely
that usually the average age comes to be abnormally low in the
majority of durable industries when the long cycle is near its high-
est level.
There are no doubt other methods of throwing light on the fun-
damental conditions of the long cycle. Shifting debt obligations
might be indicative. Crebler's suggestion that we need data' on the
combined housing and consumer durable debt obligations of mdi-.
vidual consumers in relation to their income is interesting in this
connection. Also, some method is needed to represent the changing
pressure of business debt obligations. The combined movement of
several aggregative variables—population changes, family forma-
tion, changes in business population, and others—must be con-
sidered, although work done so far indicates that chief reliance can-
not be placed on aggregates.
Special conditions existing at any given time must be carefully
weighed. The large demand for educational, commercial, and public
utility construction is a current illustration. The reasons for the
level of demand in each of these three major cases differ substan-
tially, and, with the exception of public utility construction, they
appear to center on forces that the techniques suggested above
would not be likely to uncover. For example, wartime material
shortages created a backlog of demand for commercial and éduca-
tional construction. I believe that serious depressions occur only at
low levels of the long cycle. If this is true what we need to fore-
cast is the imminence of such low levels.
A study of the business situation offers little
promise in classifying recessions because the unfolding is quite simi-
lar in early recessions. From the point of view of indication of
needed early action, a classification into concomitant long cycles
and business cycles offers substantially more promise than Gor-
don's classification.
MAURICEW.LEE, Washington State College
The principal papers presented at this conference were con-
cerned with national fluctuations and with national policies to com-
bat them. They did not explore intranational fluctuations, the trans-
mission of intranational fluctuations from region to region, and.the
possibility that a first line of national policies to combat national
depression might well take the form of policies designed to isolate
anSI prevent the transmission of subnational fluctuations.
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Intranational fluctuations might well be a suitable area of inquiry
for subsequent meetings of this group. Among others, the following
questions might be explored:
1. Intranational Fluctuations. What evidence do we have either
confirming or negating the concept of subnational fluctuations?
Many studies, some published, some in thesis or manuscript form
and not otherwise widely known, have dealt with regional fluctua-
tions. As a first step a bibliography of known studies of this sort
might be prepared and circulated to members of this conference,
with a request for the addition of any other known titles. On this
basis, a paper might be presented to a future session of the con-
ference dealing with a "survey of contemporary knowledge of intra-
national fluctuations."
2. The Transmission of Intranational Fluctuations. To the best
of my knowledge, this subject has been little explored by existing
studies. Most regional cycle studies have suggested some fairly
obvious relationships between the timing of regional vs. the timing
of national turns, and that has been the end of the matter. A much
more penetrating study dealing with the mechanisms by which
fluctuations in one region are transmitted to others is required.
We may borrow heavily from the techniques of international eco-
nomic analysis. We need information upon regional trade balances,
upon interregional capital and money flows. There is a clear use for
input-output analysis.
8. National and Intranational Fluctuations. Are there any identi-
fiable intranational fluctuations that have shown a consistent lead
relation to national fluctuations? Presumably no such consistent
relationships will be disclosed. But national fluctuations will be pre-
ceded by fluctuations in some subnational regions and the identifi-
cation of such patterns may provide a helpful guide to the early per-
ception of developing national trends.
4. Intranational Fluctuations and Policies to Combat Depression.
Any cycle turning point for the national economy will be preceded
by turns in some subnational units and followed by turns in others.
Most of our antidepression policy is directed to the national level.
It is possible that we can construct policies designed to offset re-
gional declines before their effects are transmitted elsewhere within
the national economy.
5. Variations in Vulnerability of Subnational Units. We know in a
general way that different regions show differing degrees of vulner-
ability to different kinds of national depressing forces. A general
decline in farm prices will have much greater impact upon the
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total economy of the Great Plains—Intermountain region than upon
the New England economy. The application of selective countering
measures in the more vulnerable regions may discourage the cle-
velo.pment of secondary repercussions that will transmit the re-
gional depression to a broader market.
6. Policies for Combating Intranational Depression. While na-
tional depressions quickly develop to a stage requiring national ac-
tion, there are still wide intranational differences in the magnitude
of such depressions. And, as suggested above, appropriate subna-
tional measures may contribute to the preventing or mitigation of
national depressions. Among the many measures that might be con-
sidered are:(1) Development of public works programs with
known variations in regional impact. This will require a consider-
able advance preparation of input-output data. (2) Policies for
greater variation in regional credit and loan policies.
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